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1. Introduction 
The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is a plurilateral agreement that aims 
to ensure transparency and non-discrimination in public purchases. The GPA was first negotiated 
during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1973-79) and came into effect on 
January 1, 1981. A 1987 Protocol amended the Tokyo Round Procurement Code and the new 
version entered into force on January 1, 1988. The GPA, as it stands today, was negotiated in 
parallel with the Uruguay Round of the GATT and came into effect on January 1, 1996.The 
URGPA now has 42 Contracting Parties as its signatories2, who have recently3 negotiated a new 
deal updating the procurement rules set in the URGPA and offering additional market access 
opportunities.   
Article XIX: 5 of the URGPA requires that all Contracting Parties report data on procurement by 
government entities to the Committee on Government Procurement. These data pertain to the 
value and the number of contracts awarded by government procuring entities to winning 
suppliers who bid for them through oneof the three procurement practices outlined in the 
Agreement – open tendering, selective tendering and limited tendering. The GPA requires that 
only procurement above a certain threshold value be subject to internationally competitive 
bidding. 
The data requirements under Article XIX: 5 of the URGPA are comprehensive4 and in so far as 
GPA signatories submit these data5, the latter are the most reliable source of information on both 
the size of public markets in these countries and the extent to which these markets are 
contestable. In fact, submitting data on procurement is one of the best ways of ensuring 
transparency in public procurement and highlighting any break in trend in public purchase 
decisions that signals discrimination. However, most developing countries, especially emerging 
economies, are non-members of the GPA and therefore have no comparable data reporting 
obligations. In most cases, this has led to an absence of any reliable data on these countries’ 
public purchases, which poses a serious challenge in international negotiations on the subject of 
procurement liberalization as well as in examining the impact of protectionist measures in these 
countries’ public markets on access to foreign firms. Both of these are significant objectives 
which can be successfully addressed only with reliable and adequate data. 
Moreover it turns out that the data reporting requirements under Article XVI: 4 of the text of the 
recently revised GPA deal are less onerous. For instance, in a significant departure from Article 
XIX: 5(b) of the URGPA, the number and value of central government contracts are no longer 
required to be reported by the nationality of the winning supplier.This would make it impossible 
to get information on actual foreign market access in the central government procurement 
markets of even the GPA signatories. 
In this short paper, we attempt to overcome these data challenges by developing a methodology 
to estimate the size of procurement markets in non-GPA countries as well as foreign market 
 
2This list includes Armenia, Canada, the European Community and its 27 constituents, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands with respect to Aruba, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan 
and the United States. In addition, Albania, China, Georgia, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Oman, Panama 
and Ukraine are in the process of negotiating their accession to the GPA. The list comprises primarilydeveloped 
countries with Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions; most developing and all LDCs have chosen not 
to be a part of the GPA. 
3The negotiations on government procurement were concluded successfully on 15 December 2011.  
4Article XIX:5(a) of the URGPA requires data to be submitted on the value of contracts awarded both above and 
below the threshold. Article XIX:5(b) requires data on above-thresholdprocurement to be classified by procuring 
entities and by goods and services according to the nationality of the winning supplier. Article XIX:5(c) requires 
data on the use of limited tendering practices broken down by entity and by categories of goods and services and 
Article XIX:5(d)on derogations from the principles of Most Favoured Nation and National Treatment. 
5Unfortunately, only half of the 42 Contracting Parties (Canada, EU-15, Hong Kong , Japan, Norway and the United 
States) have made statistical submissions regularly since the URGPA came into being and even amongst these, there 
are significant differences, both in terms of what is included and how it is included.  
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access therein. We also show the results from this methodology for estimating the EU’s access in 
select emerging economies’ public markets – these comprise the BRIC & Turkey. In addition to 
the methodological contribution, these results may also be useful in the context of the on-going 
EU-India bilateral negotiations towards a preferential trade agreement (PTA). 
 
2. Estimating the size of contestable government procurement market in non-
GPA countries 
In the absence of actual data on government procurement, information on the size of public 
markets in non-GPA countries is gleaned from government expenditure data for them, available 
from their national budget documents. Such data are also compiled by the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics, the OECD and the UN’s Standard National Accounts (SNA).  
Data availability constraints meant that we needed to use data on government expenses from 
different sources,such as the OECD (for Russia & Turkey), UN SNA (for Brazil & India) and 
China Statistics Census. Unfortunately, data were not available for Brazil in 2007 and only until 
2004 for China. 
Total government expenditure includes government’s consumption expenses and investment or 
gross capital formation expenditure. This amount needs to be adjusted to exclude estimates of 
defence expenditure, compensation of employees, expenses on items like interest payments, 
subsidies, debt write-offs, welfare payments, grants and loans and payments to international 
organizations like the IMF, to provide an estimate of contestable public procurement. 
Thus, we have: 
 
Adjusted GG expenses = GFCE + GFKF – (COE + Subsd + NCT + NKT) 
where  
GG = General government6 
GFCE = Government Final Consumption Expenditure 
GFKF = Government Fixed Capital Formation 
COE = Compensation of employees 
Subsd = Subsidies 
NCT = Net Current Transfers 
NKT = Net Capital Transfers 
 
However, these adjusted expenses arenot directly translatable into an estimate of the contestable 
procurement market. To begin with, the entire amount would not be subject to the rules of an 
international agreement such as the WTO’s GPA. Then not all procurement contracts are above 
GPA-specified thresholds. Finally, most large value contracts are in services but most services 
remain uncovered in the GPA andeven for scheduled services, market access restrictions often 
remain high so that procurement markets may remain effectively uncontested.  
In view of the above, we provide two sets of estimates, which can be taken as the minimum 
lower and the maximum upper bound of the likely contestable procurement markets in our non-
GPA countries. Our first set of estimates, reported in Table 1 below, assume that 10% of the 
adjusted government expenses are contestable in the case of BRIC & Turkey. Our second set of 
estimates, also reported in the table below, assume that 30% of the adjusted government 
expenses are contestable, which therefore simply triples the size of the market in these countries. 
With these estimates, the size of the contestable markets in these countries ranges from €9.3 - 
                                                 
6According to the OECD, general government accounts are consolidated central, state and local government 
accounts, social security funds and non-market non-profit institutions controlled and mainly financed by government 
units. 
€27.8 bn in Brazil (2006); €17.2 - €51.5 bn in China (2004); €6.1 - €18.4 bn in India (2007); €8.7 
- €26 bn in Russia (2007); and €3.8 - €11.3 bn in Turkey (2007). 
As it turns out, there are several justifications for the analysis here and the assumptions made.  
Firstly, the 10-30% share of adjusted expenses that we consider contestable is in line with the 
share of contestable (above-threshold) in total procurement calculated from the actual data 
submissions by EU (14%), Korea (32.6%) and Japan (33.8%) to the WTO7. In fact, in keeping 
with the rising shares of contestable procurement in the total since the year 2000, our 10% lower 
bound is higher than the 5% shares calculated for developed countries during the 1980s 
(Hoekman, 1997) and the 1990s (OECD, 2002; Evenett&Shingal, 2006; Shingal, 2005, 2011).  
Secondly, since the definition of General Government according to the Statistical Glossary of the 
OECD includes all levels of government, the 30% share is a strict upper bound as non-GPA 
countries are unlikely to subject non-Annex 1 procurement to the same extent of liberalization as 
Annex 1 procurement8. Even so, our estimates are smaller than the magnitudes of contestable 
procurement markets for these countries that Anderson et.al.(2011a, p. 14-15) calculate;the latter 
correspond to a share of contestable in total procurement ranging from 17-33%. In fact, a 10-
20% share of contestable procurement in the total may be a more realistic magnitude of de jure 
market access in non-GPA countries. 
Table 1: Estimates of contestable public procurement markets in non-GPA countries 
Country Year € bn Share of GDP (%) Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Brazil 2006 92.7 10.4 9.3 27.8 1.0 3.1
Brazil 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Russia 2006 83.0 10.8 8.3 24.9 1.1 3.2
Russia 2007 86.5 8.8 8.7 26.0 0.9 2.7
India 2006 50.8 6.7 5.1 15.2 0.7 2.0
India 2007 61.3 7.1 6.1 18.4 0.7 2.1
Turkey 2006 34.6 8.2 3.5 10.4 0.8 2.4
Turkey 2007 37.8 8.1 3.8 11.3 0.8 2.4
China 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China 2004 171.7 14.1 17.2 51.5 1.4 4.2
Adjusted GG Expenses Contestable market (€ bn) Contestable market (share of GDP, %)
 
Source: OCED for Russia & Turkey; UN SNA for Brazil & India; China Statistics Census for China. 
Note: GG stands for General Government; n.a. data not available. In the case of Brazil & India, adjusted GG 
expenses = GFCE + GFKF – COE as data was unavailable for the other attributes. For China, adjusted GG expenses 
= Total Govt. Expd. – (National Defense + Administrative Expenses + Pension & Social Welfare Expd. + Subsidies) 
as we needed to use a different data source. Lower bound is estimated at 10% of adjusted GG expenses. Upper 
bound is estimated at 30% of adjusted GG expenses. 
 
3. Estimating foreign market access in non-GPA countries’ public markets 
Estimates of contestable procurement markets in non-GPA countries can be computed using the 
methodology in the preceding section. To arrive at estimates of foreign procurement and a 
particular partner’s (in our illustrative case, the EU’s) market access disaggregated by sectors, 
we use the methodology described below, in the spirit of the following statement: “the likely 
eventual success rate of each country’s suppliers in selling into GPA-covered public 
procurement markets should be evaluated in light of available information concerning their 
respective competitiveness in international markets generally.” (Anderson et.al., 2011a, p 22)   
 
                                                 
7On the other hand, the US reports a 99% share for contestable procurement in the total in the year 2007 and given 
the less-liberalized nature of non-GPA countries on the whole and political economy constraints in liberalizing 
procurement markets therein, it is unlikely that any of them would subject more than 30% of their public purchases 
to internationally competitive bidding.Norway (93%, 2007), Lichtenstein (100%, 2010) and Hong Kong (98%, 
2010) too report very high shares of contestable procurement in the totalbut these are all much smaller economies 
and also more liberal than our set of emerging economies. 
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The estimate ofa non-GPA country’scontestable procurement marketis first multiplied by the 
share of itspublic imports in its total government demand. The data on the latter are taken from 
the GTAPdatabase for the year 2007. This yields an estimate of this country’s foreign 
procurement, which is then multiplied by the share of a particular partner’s exports in the non-
GPA country’stotal imports. Data on the latter are taken from UN Comtrade for bilateral goods 
trade and the OECD for bilateral services trade. This productprovides an estimate of thatpartner's 
access in the non-GPA country’sprocurement market. This last estimate is then disaggregated by 
sector according to the relative share of each sector in the non-GPA country’stotal government 
demand (taken from GTAP data again). 
 
Thus, we have:  
MAijkt= [ATjt*(GMdjkt/GTdjkt)*(Xikt/Mjkt)]*(GTdjkt/∑GTdjkt) 
where  
MAijkt = Estimate of country i’s access in partner j’s procurement market in sector k at time t 
ATj= Estimate of contestable public procurement in partner j 
GMdjk/GTdjk= Share of imported government demand in total government demand in partner j 
Xik/Mjk= Share of country i’s private sector exports in partner j’s private sector imports 
GTdjkt/∑GTdjkt= Relative share of sector k in total government demand in partner j  
 
This methodology is not without its shortcomings.  
 
Firstly, these estimates of public market access assume that the share of apartner’s exports in a 
non-GPA country’s total imports is identical for the public sector and the private sector. These 
estimates also assume that the composition of a non-GPA country’s public importsis identical to 
the composition of its aggregate government demand. Both of these are restrictive but necessary 
assumptions.  
 
Secondly, imported government demand in GTAP data does not capture the participation of 
foreign affiliates in public markets and to the extent that this participation is positive, our 
methodologyunderestimatesthe value of foreign procurement. On the other hand, GTAP data 
seem to grossly overstate the value of public imports. For instance, the ratio of public imports in 
GTAP to those reported to the WTO (actual data) for the year 2007 is 5.8 for Japan and 4 for the 
EU. Fortunately for us though, this discrepancy is unlikely to influence our results significantly 
as we use the share of imported government demand in total government demand (GMdjkt/GTdjkt) 
in computing our estimates and assuming that the GTAP data is equally inflated for both 
domestic (GTd-Mdjkt) and imported government demand(GMdjkt), the former shares are likely to 
remain unaffected.  
 
Finally, data on government demand in GTAP only includes consumption, which is likely to 
underestimate foreign market access in sectors9 where the share of public investment demand in 
 
9These could include machinery, equipment, utilities, construction, repair and installation services, architectural and 
engineering services, land and air transport services, and sewage-disposal and sanitation services. 
total public demand is significant10. This said, there is no a priori reason to expect public 
investment demand in these sectors to be met more by imports than domestically, which suggests 
that the magnitude of the bias in estimating market access in these sectors may not be very 
significant. 
 
Despite these drawbacks, however, in the absence of actual data, the use of this methodology 
cannot be substituted. 
The estimates of the EU’s access in these non-GPA public markets in the year 2007 using our 
methodology are reported in Table 2 below. The estimates of the EU's access in these public 
markets are as follows: Brazil - €3.9 - €11.9 mn (11.7% of total foreign procurement); China - 
€22.8 - €68.3 mn (19.5% of total foreign procurement); India - €23.8 - €71.4 mn (18.6% of total 
foreign procurement); Russia - €6.5 - €19.5 mn (42.1% of total foreign procurement); and 
Turkey - €28.2 - €84.7 mn (41.7% of total foreign procurement). Note that Table 2 provides a 
range of estimates depending on whether the contestable procurement market in the non-GPA 
country is 10 or 30% of adjusted government expenses. 
Table 2: Estimates of the EU’s access in select non-GPA country procurement markets 
(€‘000s, 2007) 
Sectors Brazila Brazilb Chinaa Chinab Indiaa Indiab Russiaa Russiab Turkeya Turkeyb
Agriculture forests fishery 44.5 133.6 1.6 4.7 34.8 104.5 81.0 243.1 1451.1 4353.3
Mining and energy extraction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Food beverages tobacco 37.4 112.1 0.0 0.0 64.2 192.7 18.5 55.5 527.1 1581.2
Textiles 27.6 82.8 0.0 0.0 263.8 791.5 1136.6 3409.8 876.2 2628.6
Wearing apparel 7.1 21.2 0.0 0.0 220.6 661.8 5.6 16.9 315.6 946.8
Leather products 7.4 22.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 35.8 140.0 420.1
Wood products 1.3 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.3 78.9
Paper products, publishing 164.2 492.6 0.0 0.0 2955.3 8865.9 0.0 0.0 3042.5 9127.4
Petroleum, coal products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.2 9.7
Chemical, rubber, plastic products 789.1 2367.4 1.7 5.1 2027.5 6082.5 4611.5 13834.5 5078.2 15234.6
Mineral products nec 17.7 53.2 0.0 0.0 2.6 7.9 0.0 0.0 142.3 426.8
Ferrous metals 21.1 63.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 284.2 852.7
Metals nec 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metal products 30.7 92.2 0.0 0.0 163.2 489.6 5.9 17.7 234.6 703.8
Motor vehicles and parts 659.4 1978.3 0.0 0.0 2561.4 7684.2 404.0 1212.1 7943.9 23831.6
Transport equipment nec 2.4 7.2 0.0 0.0 313.9 941.7 97.6 292.8 0.0 0.0
Electronic equipment 71.5 214.6 0.0 0.0 4251.9 12755.6 22.6 67.7 1872.0 5615.9
Machinery and equipment nec 111.1 333.2 0.0 0.0 3950.4 11851.1 11.4 34.1 817.9 2453.8
Manufactures nec 15.6 46.9 0.0 0.0 85.5 256.4 73.0 218.9 708.1 2124.3
Electricity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gas manufacture, distribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.3 55.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 23.7
Transport Svs 805.0 2414.9 2997.1 8991.4 747.8 2243.5 11.0 32.9 779.0 2336.9
Other commercial svs 421.9 1265.6 4704.3 14112.8 3270.9 9812.8 n.a. n.a. 2980.4 8941.1
Other govt. svs 746.2 2238.7 15071.6 45214.7 2863.5 8590.6 n.a. n.a. 985.2 2955.5
Total 3981.4 11944.1 22776.2 68328.6 23795.9 71387.6 6490.0 19470.0 28215.6 84646.9
Total contestable market (€ bn) 9.3 27.9 17.2 51.6 6.1 18.3 8.7 26.1 3.8 11.4
Total FP (€ mn) 34.1 102.3 116.9 350.7 127.9 383.7 15.4 46.2 67.6 202.8
Coverage, year
Share of EU's market access in:
Total contestable market (%)
Total FP (%) 41.7
A1-3 2007
0.04
11.7
A1-3 2006 A1-3 2004 A1-3 2007 A1-3 2007
0.740.13
19.5
0.39
18.6
0.07
42.1  
Source:UNSNA, OECD, GTAP, UN Comtrade, OECD Bilateral Trade in Services; own calculations 
Note:(1) There is a range of estimates depending on whether the contestable procurement market is (a) 10 or (b) 
30% of adjusted government expenses. (2) FP stands for foreign procurement.  
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10 If we compare total public spending in 2007 from GTAP data (which come from Eurostat input-output tables) to 
Eurostat data on government spending, then from total public expenditure of €7bn, about €320 mn is public capital 
investment, which gives us a share of 4.5%.  Assuming that half of this is defence-related expenditure, 2.25% of the 
total "non-defense" government budget could be in the investment account. Thus we could increase the size of 
public demand in “investment-heavy” sectors by 2.25% to account for the “missing” public investment demand 
component. I would like to thank Joe Francois for this information. 
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As a share of total foreign procurement by these governments, the EU’s market access is 
significant in Russia and Turkey, while as a share of a partner’s total contestable market, India’s 
public markets are also important to the EU, which helps explain the importance that the EU has 
attached to this subject in its bilateral trade negotiations with India. 
In terms of sectoralcomposition, the following sectors are important from the perspective of the 
EU’s access in each of these public markets (these sectors accounted for at least 10% of the EU’s 
total access in each market): 
Brazil: Chemicals & rubber, motor vehicles & parts, transport, OCS (other commercial services) 
& OSG (other government services) together accounted for 85.9% of the EU’s access in Brazil’s 
public market.  
India: Paper, motor vehicles, electronic equipment, other machinery & equipment, OCS & OSG 
together accounted for 83.4% of the EU’s access in India’s public market.  
Russia: Textiles, chemicals & rubber; together accounted for 88.6% of the EU’s access in 
Russia’s public market.  
Turkey: Paper, chemicals, rubber, motor vehicles & OCS together accounted for 67.5% of the 
EU’s access in Turkey’s public market. 
European firms are thus likely to gain more in these sectors from any successful procurement 
liberalization in these partner public markets. Conversely, European interests are also more 
likely to be adversely affected in these sectors as a result of any protectionist measures in these 
partner public markets. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The WTO (2011a) has noted recently that the benefits of statistical reporting range from 
increasing transparency to encouraging non-GPA countries to accede to this plurilateral 
agreement. Towards the same objectives and in the absence of reliable data on the public 
purchases of non-GPA countries, this paper suggests a methodology to estimate both the size of 
procurement markets in non-GPA countries and the extent of foreign procurement therein. It also 
uses this methodology to provide estimates of the EU’s access in the public markets of fivemajor 
emerging economies – Brazil, India, Russia, China and Turkey. 
Several recent and on-going developments underline the significance of providing estimates of 
total and contestable public procurement in non-GPA countries, especially in emerging 
economies. Firstly, new market access opportunities11 are likely to make themselves available as 
a result of successful WTO negotiations on a revised GPA deal, which may also get non-GPA 
countries interested. Secondly, long-standing opponents of the GPA are already beginning to get 
interested. India, for instance, acquired an Observer status in February 2010 and the WTO 
(2011b), in its revised text, exhorts more and more non-signatories to do the same to enable them 
to learn more about the system in place. Thirdly, an increasing number of non-GPA countries are 
making commitments on this subject in their PTAs (for details see Anderson et.al. 2011b).     
Finally, in a significant departure from Article XIX: 5(b) of the URGPA, the number and value 
of central government contracts are no longer required to be reported by the nationality of the 
winning supplier in Article XVI: 4 of the revised GPA text. This would make it impossible to get 
information on actual foreign market access in the central government procurement markets of 
the GPA countries. The methodology suggested in this paper can therefore also be used to 
provide estimates of de facto market access in GPA countries. 
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